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POLITICAL CRIME IN EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF FRANCE,
GERMANY AND ENGLAND. By Barton L. Ingraham.* University of
California- Berkeley Press, 1979. Pp. 380.
Professor Ingraham has undertaken a comparative examination
of Political Crime in France, Germany and Great Britain from the
French Revolution in 1789 to the present. The undertaking is most
ambitious. Perhaps because of that, the author's handling of this
subject is uneven. Yet, the book is not without its merits; chief
among them is the compilation of foreign statutory and other legal
material dealing with political crime that is not readily accessible
to the United States reader. Ingraham finds patterns in the develop-
ment of political crimes common to all three countries. His insights
are interesting, if not entirely original. Generally, however, these
merits should not obscure the basic fact that this book does not
add a great deal to our understanding of political crime.
In Ingraham's judgment, American scholarship on political crime
suffers from a general subjectivity of approach as well as three
specific deficiencies. These deficiencies are: (1) the assumption that
political crime is aberrational in this country; (2) the tendency to
define political crime in terms of the motivation of the actor rather
than the reasons for prosecution or the imposition of other legal
sanction; and (3) a parochialism of perspective attributable to the
absence in the United States of the more extreme forms of political
violence and polarization that have characterized the experience
of other nations.1 To overcome these deficiencies, Ingraham begins
from the premise that the management of dissent and internal con-
flict presents problems common to all governments. He seeks to
demonstrate this by offering an operational definition of criminal
law and an explanation of political crime within that framework.
He then proceeds to his comparative analysis of legal measures
to control political crime in France, Germany and Great Britain.
Ingraham attaches great methodological significance to the
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general definition of crime. In defining crime, he rejects the
positivist approach because, as he recognizes, what is defined as
criminal in statutes is not always treated as criminal in practice.
In his view, behavior is criminal only when it elicits what he calls
the "repressive response", that is, "the desire to inflict suffering
on the wrongdoer or to eliminate any further activities of a similar
kind on his part or on the part of others similarly disposed."' Thus,
the proper focus is upon the behavior of the law enforcement
authorities and not the subjective purpose of the actor or the
character of his act.'
As a reaction to undesirable conduct, the repressive response
is far stronger than other measures of social control such as ad-
ministrative regulation or the private dispute resolution process.
To Ingraham the difference is pivotal. The less severe measures
are designed to regulate behavior; they work on the premise that
human activity may be harmful in some forms but not in all. The
objective is to control the harmful aspects of such activity, not
to eradicate the activity itself. The author acknowledges that
criminal laws are sometimes enforced in a regulatory manner, but
he places such laws outside the scope of his study even though
their application might be governed by purely political considera-
tions. Thus, as a preliminary matter, he defines crime as:
any act or omission or course of behavior deemed to be wrongful
and injurious to the society as a whole or to its political leaders
which they, acting through their law makers, interpreters, and
enforcers, seek to punish or permanently prevent from recurring.'
Ingraham's next step is to identify four types of conduct which
traditionally have been regarded as political crimes: (1) acts of
betrayal; (2) challenges to political authority and legitimacy; (3) hin-
drance of official function; and (4) usurpation of granted powers.'
Id. at 7.
In the author's opinion, many writers on the subject of political crime become fnired
in subjectivity because their concept of political crime attaches great significance to the
motive of the actor. B. INGRAHAM, supra note 1;at ix, 3-5. His quest is for a theory of political
crime thatois not a function of the writer's political leanings.
B. INGRAHAM, supra note 1, at 13.
These four categories of political crime are distilled from a longer and more detailed
compilation. It includes offenses which have been regarded as political crimes by some
governments from the time of the Greek city-states to the beginning of the nineteenth
century. B. INGRAHAM, supra note 1, at 21-22. The list is quite encompassing. Except for the
fact that the offenses involve a challenge to established authority directly or indirectly,
nothing about them suggests an immediate connection with the subject of political crime.
Ingraham purports to clarify this connection, but does not succeed.
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These categories overlap, in some instances significantly, and each
includes specific offenses ranging from the serious to the relative-
ly minor. The reader anticipates some refinement at this juncture,
but is disappointed. Ingraham never adequately explains the fac-
tors which prompt the state to treat some offenders as political
criminals and others as common criminals. This omission is all the
more perplexing since the distinction is crucial to Ingraham's at-
tempt to understand political crime in objective terms.'
Ingraham makes a major point in claiming that the motivation
of the actor is not the key to understanding political crime. In of-
fering an alternative theory, however, he does not probe deeply
enough the motivations of governing officials. Despite a pro-
fessed interest in the actual administration of criminal law,7 In-
graham writes what is in the main a comparative history of legisla-
tion designed to protect the interests of established political authori-
ty. While there is merit in this type of descriptive enterprise, it
does not advance the more fundamental explanatory objective that
Ingraham set for himself at the outset. For example, Ingraham
regards assassination of the head of state as the quintessential
political crime.' But does this characterization really fit John Hin-
ckley, the man who attempted to murder President Reagan? What
difference would it make if the government tried to punish Hin-
ckley more severely than is normally appropriate in such cases,
solely because Hinckley acted for political reasons?9 Notwithstan-
I B. INGRAHAM, supra note 1, at 18-22. Curiously, Ingraham seems to think that it is easier
to understand why certain offenses have been regarded as political than to understand
why they have also been considered criminal. Id. at 22. Ingraham declares, somewhat
tautologically, that offenses are political crimes if the state treats them as such. Id. at
19. The important analytical question, however, is why and under what circumstances the
state would choose to distinguish among offenders along political lines.
B. INGRAHAM, supra note 1, at 15-17.
B. INGRAHAM, supra note 1, at 20, 23-24.
o The state's interest in protecting life, any life, accounts for the heirarchy of offenses
subsumed within the law of homicide including the general law of attempts. This interest
is objectively rooted and its vindication is sufficient to authorize punishment of a life taker,
any life taker, without regard to his motive. Presumably no one considers homicide per
se a political crime.
But consider these situations under Ingraham's approach. Assassination of the head of
state is a species of homicide, yet, it is also, according to Ingraham, a form of political
crime. If Ingraham is correct, was Lee Harvey Oswald a political criminal for taking the
life of President Kennedy in 1963? At the time there was no federal law dealing with
presidential assassination. The only law under which Oswald could have been punished
for bringing about Kennedy's death was the Texas general law of homicide. See S. REP.
No. 498, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-4, reprinted in [1965] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2866-69.
The other obvious argument for treating Oswald as a political criminal is the identity of
his victim. The reader should recall that in making this judgment Ingraham would not
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ding the author's emphasis on methodology and precise terminology,
the reader must guess as to how Ingraham would deal with these
questions. In the final analysis, Ingraham's conception of political
crime is not sharply differentiated from ordinary crime. This is
a major shortcoming, given Ingraham's purpose of rescuing cur-
rent thinking about political crime from its subjectivity.
Ingraham asserts that prevention, not regulation or punish-
ment, has been the chief objective of laws dealing with political
crime.O1 However, the extent to which Ingraham emphasizes preven-
tion is questionable. Many criminal laws are enacted and enforced
for overlapping and occasionally conflicting purposes. The state,
in the run-of-the-mill criminal prosecution, regularly must decide
which objectives to emphasize and how best to proceed. This is
true of the prosecution of political crime as well. Yet, Ingraham
discounts the regulatory objective in the enforcement of laws deal-
ing with political crimes, at least prior to the twentieth century.
He does acknowledge regulatory features in the insane asylums
for dissenters in the Soviet Union 1 and in the host of registration
and disclosure requirements applicable to Communist Party
members in this country.12
One wonders whether the emergence of the regulatory approach
to political crime is an entirely modern development. It is not
necessary, or perhaps even desirable, to eradicate all politically
consider Oswald's possible motives, such as allegiance to the Soviet Union or Cuba.
Now there is a federal criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. 1751, dealing with presidential assassina-
tion and John Hinckley will be prosecuted under it. Surely the presence of a presidential
assassination statute does not distinguish Hinckley from Oswald. Under Ingraham's ap-
proach, the argument for treating Hincldey as a political criminal is even stromger than
it is for Oswald. This logic strikes me as perverse. Perhaps Ingraham would regard them
both as political criminals, but that answer would only confound the confusion since evenhand-
ed enforcement of this law against all attempted assassins does not seem to be an example
of political crime prosecution. Ingraham acknowledges this but never adequately explains
why governments sometimes abandon the policy of evenhanded enforcement to deal with
offenders viewed as political deviants.
10 He notes several preventive aspects of such laws: (1) the predisposition to eliminate
political offenders from the scene either by execution or banishment; (2) the prevalence
of speech offenses; (3) the regularity with which anticipatory crimes such as attempt and
conspiracy are charged; (4) the special procedures associated with the conduct of political
trials; (5) the extralegal functions of political trials, and (6) the manner in which sanctions
are applied, withheld or withdrawn for political purposes. B. INGRAHAM, stpra note 1, at
26-34.
11 For a gripping discussion of this practice see Z. MEDVEDEV & R. MEDVEDEV, A QUES-
TION OF MADNESS (1971).
12 A review of these laws and the Supreme Court's treatment of them is contained in
N. DORSEN, P. BENDER. B. NEUBORNE & J. GoRA, EMERSON, HABER & DORSEN'S POLITICAL AND
CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES, 101-143 (4th ed. 1976).
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offensive activity to render it impotent.18 It seems that this point
has not been lost on the political leaders of France, Germany and
Great Britain. In the nineteenth century they possessed a wide
range of responses to so-called political crime from the death penal-
ty to relatively mild penalties like banishment and custodia honesta.4
It does not seem plausible to think that sanctions were imposed
against political criminals without reference to the deterrent ef-
fect on sympathizers. Much of Ingraham's research suggests that
rulers often exercised a high degree of political skill in manipulat-
ing available legal procedures to pursue ends which must be charac-
terized as regulatory.5 In the final analysis, Ingraham's emphasis
on the dichotomy between prevention and regulation is unconvinc-
ing.
Fortunately, many parts of this book are not burdened by In-
graham's highly conceptualized methodology. The author's review
of laws dealing with political crime in each country is detailed and
brings out some interesting patterns. The discussion is organized
along strict chronological lines and is divided into five parts, each
apparently coinciding with a major era in the evolution of political
crime in France, Germany and Great Britain:
1. 1770-1789-A Comparative Analysis of Laws Relating to
Political Crime and Their Administration in France, Ger-
many and Great Britain.
2. 1789-1830-The French Revolution and the Period of
Reaction.
3. 1830-1851 -A Time of Ferment; Springtime of the Policy
of Leniency.
4. 1852-1914-A Time of Consolidation: The Summer of the
Policy of Leniency.
5. 1914-1970-Political Crime in an Age of Ideology: The
Autumn and Withering of the Policy of Leniency.
" The discretion of law enforcement officials to accomplish a variety of objectives is
well documented. K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1976); K. DAVIS,
PoLicE DISCRETION (1975). Preventive and regulatory objectives can be achieved simultaneous-
ly. The tactical advantage of such enforcement flexibility is important in the area of political
crime since it can provide a useful subterfuge for the pursuit of political objectives for
which Ingraham's "repressive response" might appear too heavy-handed.
" This term refers to "honorable punishment", a practice which occurred in all three
countries. It meant the separation of political from common criminals and according them
better treatment.
" An example of this type of strategy is President Nixon's compilation of an "enemies"
list. Based on the list, he caused the IRS to audit the tax returns of individuals politically
hostile to him. Another example stems from President Nixon's well-known contempt for
the Washington Post. It apparently led him to generate opposition to the license renewal
of a television station owned by the Post in Florida.
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This breakdown is actually a function of historical and political
developments in France. It is more or less imposed on Germany
and Great Britain even though internal developments in those coun-
tries differed significantly from those in France. Granting that a
common reference point is essential to comparative scholarship,
one can still question Ingraham's mechanical and somewhat con-
trived approach. While it may have advantages from the author's
standpoint, it is not necessarily the most illuminating way to
develop this subject matter.
Ingraham is most interesting and controversial when he places
legal developments in France, Germany and Great Britain into a
broader context. For example, he argues that the decline of monar-
chies, which had morally rooted claims of allegiance based on
religion and feudal relationships, led to a major shift in thinking
about political crime."6 After this decline, the state increasingly
had to rest its claim to loyalty on a measure of political legitimacy.
According to Ingraham, this was due to the influence of enlighten-
ment philosophy which linked political legitimacy to the consent
of the governed. The implication was that governments have obliga-
tions and that people have rights. As a result, political and social
values in nineteenth century Europe became more pluralistic and
relative. The entrenched orthodoxies of previous eras were no
longer sufficient to justify harshly punitive sanctions against the
political criminal solely on grounds of the moral reprehensibility
of his action. Ingraham perjoratively refers to this general move-
ment as liberalism. 17
He contends that as the law of political crime lost its moral com-
ponent under the influence of liberalism, it gradually ceased to
focus on punishment as an objective. The political criminal, unlike
the common thief, had a kind of honorable status; if he was de-
viant, it was not because of a lack of character, but because of
the political means by which he proposed to achieve the common
good. 8 According to Ingraham, this view of the political criminal
prevailed in France, Germany and Great B: tain and led to an ex-
tended period of lenient treatment in the nineteenth century. Large-
ly because this leniency persisted, despite periodic and in many
instances severe threats to established authority, Ingraham con-
16 B. INGRAHAM, supra note 1, at 39-44.
11 B. INGRAHAM, supra note 1, at 41.
11 B. INGRAHAM, supra note 1, at 34-35.
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cludes that ideology and philosophy have shaped the law of political
crime.' 9
Ingraham supports this thesis using examples from the twen-
tieth century. A number of forces and events reversed the nine-
teenth century pattern of leniency toward political crime. They
were: nationalism; the growing democratization of Western Euro-
pean governments;20 the Russian Revolution of 1917; and, finally
and most importantly in Ingraham's view, the emergence of posi-
tivism and related antiliberal doctrines.2' Ingraham suggests two
theories to explain positivism's influence. First, positivism implied
a rejection of the idea of natural law, which Ingraham regards as
the cornerstone of liberalism.' Second, positivism was peculiarly
adaptable to statist ideologies such as Nazism, which conceived
of the political community in highly prescriptive and inclusive
terms.23 In this conception of the state, the political criminal is im-
moral per se. By virtue of his actions, religion, or racial status,
his very existence and presence threatens the state.
While this account may explain political crime in Nazi Germany,
Ingraham overstates the relationship between ideology and political
crime. One needs to understand not only the content of ideology,
but also the reasons for its intense hostility toward non-adherents.
This inquiry necessarily entails a deeper examination of history
than Ingraham attempts. History and circumstance may influence
ideology just as much as ideology influences them. A striking ex-
ample of the author's "tunneled" history2" is the omission of any
discussion of the link between nineteenth century anti-semitism
in Europe and the treatment of the Jews under Hitler.25 Further-
more, non-ideological factors may shape twentieth century attitudes
toward the political criminal. For example, modern technology has
greatly enlarged the capability of totalitarian governments to con-
trol and repress political crime on a massive scale. Does ideology
really explain why some political leaders exploit these awesome
" B. INGRAHAM, supra note 1, at 317-23.
Ingraham's citation of this factor, See B. INGRAHAM, supra note 1, at 219-21, seems
anomalous since liberalism in part stimulated the emergence of democracies in Europe.
What he appears to mean is that the idea of popular sovereignty which underlies democracy
was easily adaptible to statist movements like facism and Nazism. Both movements regarded
the state as the perfect embodiment of popular will, and hence, a realization of the democratic
ideal.
2 B. INGRAHAM, supra note 1, at 221-27.
B. INGRAHAM, supra note 1, at 221-27.
B. INGRAHAM, supra note 1, at 227.
' D. FISCHER HISTORIANS, FALLACIES: TOWARD A LOGIC OF HISTORICAL THOUGHT 142-44 (1970).
,6 See generally, H. ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM (1951).
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means of repression to their full potential and others do not? In-
graham's thesis, while providing a helpful starting point, does not
seem to account for the excesses of Idi Amin in Uganda or the
apparent policy of leniency toward at least some dissidents in the
Soviet Union today.
At various points, Ingraham refers almost contemptuously to
liberalism's focus on the individual and in particular the individual's
constitutional rights." He apparently believes that such thinking
is dangerous and so admonishes the reader in his preface.' To make
sure that his meaning is clear, Ingraham concludes with a series
of "lessons" in the efficacy of repression. They have a hackneyed
and doctrinaire quality which will stir the emotion of only the most
resolute law and order enthusiast.
Ingraham reserves for last his sublimely Orwellian "four limiting
principles for the effective use of legal repression":
First, authorities should be careful to stay within the bounds of
legality which they themselves have created, even if it is necessary
to stretch those limits in times of emergency by specially enacted
temporary legislation.
Second, caution should be practiced in the use of preventive
measures such as mass arrests, searches and seizures, internment
without trial, suppression of news and public meetings, security
checks, and police harassment, not only because these appear to
be procedures of dubious legality even in times of emergency, but
also because, by their very nature, they tend to involve in their
operations many persons who would, but for their victimization,
have remained uncommitted or who would have even supported
the government in an open conflict with its political adversaries.
Third, nothing should be done in the way of repression to call
This is a recurrent theme. Ingraham believes that liberals are much too quick to raise
constitutional issues when preventive legal measures are employed against political offenders.
He also thinks that liberals are excessively concerned about the possibility that limited uses
of repression might lead to a police state. B. INGRAHAM, supra note 1, at xii, 41-44.
There can be little doubt as to Ingraham's meaning, for he declares:
Contrary to popular belief, repressive measures, when used with restraint, have
not lead to the spreading or strengthening of political opposition (the metastasis
theory), but instead have subdued it and forced it into legitimate and peaceful modes
of expression. Moreover, the limited use of legal repression for defensive purposes
has not led to the growth of a "police state." More often it has been the failure
to employ limited measures of repression during a period of weakness and division
which has led to the polarization of factions within society, the defeat of democracy,
and the introduction of a dictatorial regime.
B. INGRAHAM, supra note 1, at xiii.
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more public attention to political agitators than their activities
would have otherwise received.
Finally, repressive measures should never be taken without
serious consideration being given to positive responses to the
grievances which political crimes and disturbances so often
reflect.2
If they represent Ingraham's idea of governmental restraint, one
must admire his faith in the wisdom of those who govern us.
Except for assembling basic legal materials reflecting the
legislative treatment of political crime in the countries studied,
this book is of limited value. The attempt to develop an objective,
theoretically coherent basis for understanding political crime is
unsuccessful. Ironically, Ingraham does not escape the subjectiv-
ity of approach that he denounces in the work of others. Indeed,
one finishes this book with the conviction that it reveals more about
the author's politics than political crime. This is unfortunate because
Ingraham's basic purpose in writing this book is a laudable one.
Albert M. Pearson, IMI
B. INGRAHAM, supra note 1, at 323-25.
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